In this study, we ask whether economic factors that can be directly manipulated by public policy have important effects on the probability that women experience long-lasting unions. Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we estimate a fivestage sequential choice model for women's transitions between single with no prior unions, cohabiting, first-married, re-single (divorced or separated), and remarried. We control for expected income tax burdens, AFDC or TANF benefits, Medicaid expenditures, and parameters of state divorce laws, along with an array of demographic, family background, and market factors. We simulate women's sequences of transitions from age 18 to 48, and use the simulated outcomes to predict the probability that a woman with given characteristics (a) forms a first union by age 24 and maintains the union for at least 12 years, and (b) forms a second union by age 36 and maintains it for at least 12 years. While nonpolicy factors such as race and schooling prove to have important effects on the predicted probabilities of long-term unions, the policy factors have small and/or imprecisely estimated effects; in short, we fail to identify policy mechanisms that could potentially be used to incentivize long-term unions.
I. Introduction
Family formation in the U.S. changed dramatically over the last four decades: marriage rates declined, divorce rates rose sharply before leveling off, and cohabitation among unmarried couples became increasingly common. These patterns have been carefully documented (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Bumpass, et al. 1991; Cherlin 1992; Smock 2000; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007) , but researchers continue to seek a better understanding of the behavioral mechanisms by which individuals choose their marital status. To what extent does family background affect these choices? To what extent are they financial decisions? What types of "shocks" prompt individuals to revise past decisions and either enter into or dissolve relationships? In the face of rapid social change, we must continually refine our answers to these questions-particularly if incentives to choose one marital status over another are to be used as policy tools for improving the welfare of families. From elimination of the income tax "marriage penalty" to no-fault divorce laws to welfare reform, policy initiatives that address the link between marriage and well-being require a solid understanding of the forces that drive unionforming decisions.
In this study, we provide new evidence on the determinants of union formation by asking whether a range of economic factors that can be directly manipulated by public policy have important effects on the probability that women experience long-lasting unions. We use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to estimate a multi-stage choice model that follows single, 18 year-old women as they transition into and out of each cohabiting union and marriage over the next three decades. Our covariates include expected income tax burdens, maximum allowed state AFDC or TANF benefits, average state Medicaid expenditures and parameters of state divorce laws, along with a broad array of market, family background, demographic, and marital history variables. We use parameter estimates from the choice models to simulate women's union-related histories from age 18 to age 48. These simulated outcomes allow us to predict the probability of any long-term path of interest; we choose to focus on the probability that (a) an 18 year old enters her first cohabiting union and/or marriage by age 24 and maintains it for at least 12 years; and (b) a 30 year old divorcée forms a new union by age 36 and maintains it for at least 12 years. By assigning our sample members alternative sets of covariate values, we can assess the effects of various policy interventions on the likelihood of each long-term outcome. We also compare estimated "marginal effects" of policy factors to the estimated effects of race, schooling, market characteristics, and other factors that are not directly controlled by policy.
Elements of our analytic strategy have been seen in earlier research, but our approach is noteworthy for incorporating the following features. First, we depart from the existing literature in an important way by assessing the effect of each observed factor on the predicted probability of getting married and staying married or, more generally, forming a union via marriage or cohabitation and maintaining it for the long-term. Most researchers who study determinants of cohabitation, marriage, and divorce focus on the probability of a transition in the "next period" undertaken by individuals who are currently single (e.g., Blackburn 2000; Lundberg and Rose 2003; Xie et al. 2003) or cohabiting (e.g., Lichter et al. 2006; Smock and Manning 1997; Wu and Pollard 2000) or married (e.g., Friedberg 1998; Whittington and Alm 1997; Wolfers 2006) . Most of what we know about union formation and dissolution comes from such short-term estimates, yet they are inherently limited if our goal is to understand who marries for the first time and does not divorce, or cohabits and then marries and remains married, etc.-a goal that requires us to estimate each stage of the decision-making process and use sequences of "next period" transition probabilities to compute long-term probabilities. By moving the focus from year-to-year transitions to long-term paths (i.e., long-term sequences of year-to-year transitions), we are able to determine which policy and non-policy interventions are effective in promoting the formation of long-term unions. Second, we control for a number of economic policy factors simultaneously, along with demographic and family background factors (e.g., race, ethnicity, religion, living arrangements at age 14), skill factors (ability test scores, schooling attainment) and market factors (county racial and gender composition, unemployment rates). A small number of recent studies also incorporate an array of policy variables (Blau and van der Klaauw 2010; Eissa and Hoynes 2000b; Light and Omori 2007, 2011) , but the more typical approach is to focus on the effects of tax policy (Alm and Whittington 1999; Whittington and Alm 1997) or welfare policy (Bitler et al. 2004; Ellwood and Bane 1985; Grogger and Bronars 2001) or divorce laws (Friedberg 1998; Nakonezny et al. 1995; Wolfers 2006 ) on marriage-related transitions. We learn not only whether each of these policy variables "matters," but how their estimated effects on women's marital transitions compare to each other and to the estimated effects of factors that policymakers cannot directly manipulate.
Third, we focus on economic factors that are exogenous to marriage-related decisions. For example, we control for expected state income tax burdens rather than actual tax burdens, and for the generosity of states' welfare benefit rather than individuals' past or current welfare recipiency. By eliminating endogenous variation in employment, earnings, and other factors that can depend on marital status, we are able to isolate the "true" effects of economic incentives on union formation. Identification is aided by our reliance on state-level policies which, unlike federal laws, generate within-year variation in the data; in the absence of within-year variation, we would be unable to separate effects of policy from aging and duration effects.
Our approach reveals that despite often having nontrivial effects on a woman's likelihood of entering a marriage or cohabiting union, policy factors are largely unimportant when it comes to the probability of entering a union and maintaining it for several years. For example, setting each state's maximum AFDC benefit to an atypically low level (equal to the tenth percentile in the benefit distribution) increases by 18% the predicted probability that an 18 year old woman marries in the next six years, but her predicted probability of marrying and staying married for at least 12 years increases by only 9%. Moreover, because marriages substitute for cohabiting unions, this extreme policy intervention accounts for a mere 1% increase in her predicted probability of forming and maintaining any union. The elimination of unilateral divorce is predicted to increase the probability of entering and maintaining a long-term first union by 7% despite lowering the predicted probability of union entry. Other policy factors that we consider have trivial effects on the predicted probability of a long-term first union. In contrast, the estimated effects on long-term unions of such factors as race, schooling attainment, and cognitive achievement are economically significant. When we extend our simulations to second unions entered into by 30 year old women, we find that the estimated effects of policy factors are imprecisely estimated. In summary, we identify several demographic and background characteristics that substantially increase the predicted probability that a woman will cohabit or marry and stay with her partner for at least 12 years-but we find no avenues through which policy can reliably be used to incentivize long-term unions.
II. BACKGROUND
In estimating multi-stage discrete choice models for transitions into and out of cohabiting and marital unions, we control for a wide array of covariates to account for marital histories, policy and market factors, family background and demographic factors, and cognitive skill and schooling attainment.
In section IV.B, we describe each covariate and present summary statistics for our stage-specific samples. In this section, we focus on the subset of factors that can, in principle, be readily manipulated by public policy to "incentivize" long-term unions by affecting the costs or benefits associated with each marital option. We explain how these policy-related economic factors are expected to influence union-forming decisions, and we briefly summarize existing empirical evidence on the importance of these key factors.
A. Welfare Benefits
The now-defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program provided cash benefits to low-income, single mothers in the U.S. and, in some instances, to two-parent families where one parent was not biologically related to the children. Other two-parent families received no benefits unless a parent's unemployment status made them eligible for AFDC-UP. Thus, the program imposed a "marriage tax" insofar as nonmarital fertility would typically increase cash benefits and marital fertility would not. For many years, this marriage penalty was reinforced by the fact that Medicaid eligibility was tied directly to AFDC eligibility. However, reforms introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s increased Medicaid income eligibility beyond the limit set by AFDC, while also eliminating the requirement that children live with a single or cohabiting parent to be eligible for Medicaid.
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Under this program, states increased eligibility for two-parent families, reduced the generosity of benefits (in part by imposing time limits), and operated welfare-to-work programs. Each component of TANF is predicted to make marriage a more attractive option than it was under AFDC programs, although welfare-to-work programs could also discourage marriage by making women more economically independent (Oppenheimer 2000) .
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Regardless of which regime we consider, welfare programs in the U.S. provide cash benefits that are tied to varying degrees to the recipient's marital status. Moreover, benefit levelsand, therefore, the gaps in expected benefits between married and unmarried womenvary dramatically across states. suggests that cross-state variation dominates cross-year variation during this observation period, and that states tend to maintain their rankings over time. Similar cross-state variation is seen for average Medicaid expenditures for a family of four. This cross-state variation in the "cost" of marriage, as well as the additional variation caused by policy changes over time, is one avenue by which we can assess the effect of economic factors on union formation.
Numerous researchers have exploited cross-state and cross-year variation in benefit levels to assess the empirical effects of AFDC, TANF, and Medicaid on union formation. As expected, studies of the AFDC-marriage link generally find that increased benefit levels decrease the likelihood that single women marry (Blackburn 2000; Grogger and Bronars 2001; Hoynes 1997; Schultz 1998; Winkler 1994) and increase the likelihood of divorce (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Hoffman and Duncan 1995) . Moffitt et al. (1998) demonstrate that a surprisingly high percent of AFDC recipients cohabit, presumably because they are not penalized for monetary contributions made by unmarried partners. Bitler et al. (2004) find that the transition from AFDC to TANF caused fewer marriages but also less divorce, while Kaestner and Kaushal (2005) find little effect of TANF on marriage rates. These conflicting results are consistent with the fact that TANF programs simultaneously encourage marriage by increasing eligibility for married women and discourage marriage by promoting female employment. Yelowitz (1998) observes that the theoretical effect of Medicaid expansion on marriage rates is similarly ambiguous, but provides empirical evidence that the net effect of increased eligibility on entry into marriage is positive. Schultz (1998) finds that increased Medicaid and AFDC generosity decrease the probability of marriage while Decker (2000) , using data from 1965-72, provides evidence that marriage probabilities declined when Medicaid was introduced. While a great deal has been learned about the effects of welfare benefits on union formation, cohabiters' transitions have been largely overlooked in this literature. 
B. Income Taxes
A husband and wife in the U.S. who earn similar levels of taxable income often face a different federal tax burden than they would face if unmarried. A marriage penalty arises when the standard deduction for a married couple is less than twice the standard deduction for a single filer (e.g., $6,550 versus $3,900 in 1995). Similarly, a married couple in which one partner earns all or most of the taxable income generally receives a marriage bonus by using the larger standard deduction. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 reduced or eliminated the "marriage penalty" for many couples, particularly in the lower tax brackets. However, state income tax obligations continue to vary with marital status across the income distribution because many states impose a tax penalty or bonus due to differential standard deductions. Moreover, because states vary dramatically in their income tax rates and allowable deductions, the difference between the tax owed by a given couple if single or cohabiting and the tax owed if married can vary across states even in the absence of a marriage penalty or bonus.
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To illustrate how state income tax burdens vary with marital status, in table 2 we summarize the taxes owed by a hypothetical couple in three states in 1985, 1995, and 2005 , assuming one partner earns $35,000 and the other earns $20,000 in inflation-adjusted dollars. We also assume this couple has no other taxable income, no itemized deductions, and no dependents. We focus on one state (Minnesota) that imposes a marriage penalty, one state (California) that has a marriage bonus, and one state (Texas) that is marriage neutral by virtue of having no state income tax. If this couple lives in Minnesota in 1985, they owe $3,318 in state income tax if they are single or cohabiting, and $3,671 if they are married and filing jointly; in other words, this couple faces a "marriage penalty" of $353 above and beyond any penalty imposed by federal law. Because Texas has no state income tax, this couple will owe the same amount (zero) regardless of marital status. In California, they will pay $186 more in state income tax if they are single than if they are married ($1,490 versus $1,304)-i.e., they will face a marriage bonus. 6 Comparable figures for 1995 and 2005 indicate a considerable degree of stability in the tax obligations in California and, of course, Texas, but a reduction in the tax obligations and marriage penalties in Minnesota due to declining marginal tax rates.
In a seminal study of the marriage-tax link, Alm and Whittington (1999) control for individuals' federal income tax burdens in modeling transitions into marriage and find that the "marriage tax" is associated with a slight decrease in the probability that women marry. While most studies in this vein examine the effect of taxes on transitions into marriage Whittington 1995a, 1995b; Brien et al. 2006; Lopez-Laborda and Zarate-Marco 2004) , Whittington and Alm (1997) find that tax policy that penalizes married couples also has a small, positive effect on the probability of divorce. Eissa and Hoynes (2000b) find that income tax penalties have a small, imprecisely estimated, negative effect on transitions from cohabitation to marriage, but this transition has received far less attention in the literature than transitions between single and married. Moreover, most existing studies rely on federal tax laws, which only vary over time, and many compute income tax burdens on the basis of actual (endogenous) earnings rather than predicted earnings. Our analysis relies on cross-state variation in tax law to isolate the effect of income tax obligations from the effects of aging, and we assign all sample members an identical, median incomes (for themselves and their hypothetical partners) to abstract from all individualspecific variation in income and family size.
C. Divorce and Property Division
When the decision is made to dissolve a union, married couples are governed by state laws regarding grounds for divorce, the determination of alimony, and the division of property. Every state in the U.S. except New York allowed no fault divorce by the mid 1980s, and most introduced unilateral divorce as well. No fault divorce refers to a legal environment in which the petitioner is not required to establish that his/her spouse was guilty of adultery, cruelty, or other forms of marital misconduct. Unilateral divorce is a form of no fault divorce that does not require the mutual consent of both spouses. The near-universal adoption of no fault divorce does not imply that divorce is granted with equal ease in every state: states differ with respect to separation requirements preceding the granting of no fault divorce, the need for mutual consent, and the laws governing alimony and property division. No state has explicit laws stating how 6 A marriage penalty arises in Minnesota in part federal taxable income (adjusted for federal standard deductions) is considered taxable income, so the federal penalty carries through to the state. A marriage bonus arises in California because it imposes tax on the federal adjusted gross income (which does not reflect the differential federal standard deduction), while also using a lower tax rate for married couples filing jointly than for single taxpayers. unmarried, cohabiting couples should divide their property upon dissolving their union, although courts are often willing to grant "palimony" to unmarried partners if the couple has a written or implied agreement concerning property settlements.
In short, legal protection varies significantly across states for both married and unmarried couples.
Based on data from Friedberg (1998) Separation requirementswhich generally range from six months to three years-can substantially raise the cost of divorce, to the point that some individuals establish fault (if allowed by state law) to circumvent the waiting period.
There is considerable disagreement in the literature over whether unilateral and no fault divorce affect divorce decisions. Peters (1986 Peters ( , 1992 applies the Coase Theorem to argue that couples offset the direct effects of unilateral divorce via contracting. Allen (1992) questions her assumption that utility is perfectly transferable among spouses. Mechoulan (2006) observes that couples who marry prior to the adoption of no fault or unilateral laws are unable to arrange the appropriate contingent contract unless they have perfect foresight about impending changes in the law. From an empirical standpoint, it is difficult to pin down a causal effect of divorce law on divorce decisions. Bougheas and Georgellis (1999) , Ellman and Lohr (1998) , Friedberg (1998) , and Nakonezny et al. (1995) differ in the time periods considered, whether short-term or long-term effects are estimated, and how divorce outcomes are measured. A recent study by Wolfers (2006) suggests that the introduction of unilateral divorce had a small, short-lived (positive) effect on divorce rates. Although voices in the policy arena are currently calling for a return to "fault" divorce as a means of lowering divorce rates in the U.S., the literature has yet to establish whether such a switch would significantly affect divorce decisions. Moreover, we lack evidence on the extent to which divorce law affects entry into marriage and, in particular, the decision to marry rather than cohabit.
III. Estimation

A. Choice Model
Our goal is to model all stages of the union-forming process with a series of stage-specific discrete-choice models. Our data allow us to follow every woman in our sample from her initial spell of being single (with no prior marriage or cohabitation) through first cohabitation spells, first marriages, second single spells, second cohabitation spells, and so forth. Due to limited sample sizes for cohabitation spells and marriages beyond the first, however, we collapse what for some women would be a 12-stage model into the following, five-stage process: In stage 1, single women with no prior marriages or cohabiting unions decide on a period-by-period basis whether to stay single, cohabit, or marry. Women who choose cohabitation advance to stage 2, where they decide on a period-by-period basis whether to continue cohabiting, dissolve their union, or marry. Anyone who chooses to marry in stage 1 or stage 2 advances to stage 3, where they decide on a period-by-period basis whether to maintain that first marriage or divorce. Women who terminate any marriage or cohabiting union enter stage 4 (an aggregate "re-single" stage), where they again decide on a period-by-period basis whether to stay single, cohabit, or marry. If women in stage 4 choose to cohabit they reenter stage 2, which consists of all (not just first-time) cohabitation spells. Women in stages 2 or 4 who remarry move to stage 5, which consists of all second and subsequent marriages.
We assume that in each period-defined as a one-year interval-individuals choose the stagespecific alternative that maximizes expected utility. We assume the expected utility of alternative j for individual i in stage g at time t can be expressed as a linear function of various observed and unobserved factors. That is, for and 1,2,3,4,5 (1)
where j igt X represents observed factors (current spell duration, policy factors, demographic controls, etc.) and j igt  represents unobserved factors affecting the value of alternative j. Note that in stages 3 and 5, which correspond to first and subsequent marriages, alternative c (cohabitation) is unavailable because married women must divorce (i.e., choose alternative s) before cohabitation becomes an option. The model allows observed factors to vary across individuals, over time (within and between stages), and across alternatives although, in principle, many factors (race, religion, highest grade completed) are time-invariant for each woman. The parameters ( ) describing the effects of covariates on expected utility are allowed to vary across stages because relative income tax burdens, divorce laws, and many other factors are likely to have a different effect on the value of being single than on the value of cohabitation or marriage.
We assume the residuals (ε) are drawn from an extreme value distribution, which means the transition probabilities that form the likelihood function have a logistic structure. We compute standard errors that account for intertemporal correlations among the residuals for a given woman in a given stage, but we assume independence across alternatives and across stages. Thus, we independently estimate multinomial logits for stages 1 (single with no prior unions), 2 (cohabiting), and 4 (single with prior unions), and binomial logits for stages 3 and 5 (first and subsequent marriages). 8 8 We assume errors are independent across alternatives and stages because alternative specifications posed identification problems. Following Cameron and Heckman (2001) and Light and Omori (2007) , we attempted to characterize the errors in (1) 
B. Simulation
After estimating the five binomial or multinomial logit models described above, we use our parameter estimates to simulate each woman's union-forming history from age 18 to 48. The idea is to simulate the 31-year sequence of marital states (e.g., SSSSCCMSSSM…MMMM) for a large sample of women, define a dummy variable that indicates whether each simulated sequence conforms to a particular long-term path of interest, and use the mean and standard deviation of that dummy variable as our predicted probability. Specifically, we simulate each woman's history for each of 150 random draws from the estimated distribution of the parameter estimates, thus accounting for the point estimates for A key step in conducting the simulations is to decide which covariate values to use. We begin with a baseline simulation in which we assign each woman her initial, actual value for each can presumably be skirted by expanding to a two-factor loading model and imposing exclusion restrictions as in Heckman et al. (2011) , although that computationally-demanding extension is beyond the scope of the current study. Blau and van der Klaauw (2010) achieved identification in a single-stage, eight-alternative model by assuming the i  are drawn from a discrete distribution with only two support points. We replicated the Blau and van der Klaauw error structure with a three-stage model and found the estimates to be highly sensitive to the number of support points; the use of two support points yielded estimates that are virtually identical to what we obtain with an IIA assumption. 9 Angeles et al. (2005) , Blau and van der Klaauw (2010) , and Light and Omori (2011) use a similar simulation method. element of X-i.e., the value prevailing at t=1 (age 18) and g=1 (stage 1). As we simulate each period-by-period transition from age 18 to 48, we update marital history covariates (duration of current spell, number of prior cohabitations, etc.) each period to reflect the simulated outcomes while holding all other covariates constant at their initial value. By relying on actual covariate values observed at t=1, we can simulate each woman's path from age 18 to 48 regardless of whether she is observed at every age. 10 We conduct additional simulations after assigning each woman identical values for select covariates. For example, in one simulation each woman is assigned an identically "low" AFDC benefit equal to the 10 th percentile in the overall distribution, while in another simulation each woman is assigned a race/ethnicity of nonblack, non-Hispanic. For each simulation in which a single covariate or set of covariates is assigned a uniform value, all other covariates are assigned the initial, actual value as in the baseline simulation described above. This series of simulations allows us to identify the "marginal effect" of a given covariate (or set of covariates) on the predicted probability of following any long-term path of interest.
Once we obtain N·150 (where N is the number of women in our sample) simulated outcomes from age 18 to 48 for each set of assigned covariate values, the second key step is to define the long-term paths of interest. We consider one long-term path for first unions, and a similarlydefined path for second unions. From a starting point of being single with no prior unions at age 18, any woman who enters cohabitation or marriage by age 24 and remains with the same partner for at least 12 years meets our definition of a long-term first union. From a starting point of separating from a first partner at age 30, any woman who enters a new (cohabiting or marital) union by age 36 and maintains the union for at least 12 years meets our definition of a long-term second union. We choose these two paths because they meet a number of desirable criteria: First, by considering unions entered within six years of the starting point, we avoid focusing on unions formed at unusually young ages; our paths include first unions formed as late as age 24 and second union formed as late as age 36. Second, by using identical six-year entry intervals and 12-year durations for both first and second unions, we ensure that our predicted probabilities are comparable across paths. Third, 12-year durations are the longest we can consider over a 30-year observation period without introducing considerable overlap between first and second unions. 11 10 Our sample members were born in 1960-64 and our longitudinal data are from survey years 1979-2008, so relatively few respondents are observed to age 48. In addition, for variables that are not collected in an event history format, we face occasional unknown covariate values due to missed interviews. 11 In a related paper (Light and Omori 2011), we consider four alternative durations for first unions: 8, 12, 18 and 24 years. While the probability of entering a union by a given age is invariant to the duration considered, we show that the predicted probability of maintaining a union conditional on entering the union falls with duration, as does the predicted joint probability (i.e., the product of the entry and conditional probabilities). However, we find that estimated effects of covariates on the joint probability are largely invariant to the duration considered.
In presenting these predicted long-term probabilities in section V, we report both entry probabilities (e.g., the probability of forming a first union by age 24) and joint probabilities (e.g., the probability of forming a first union by age 24 and maintaining it for at least 12 years). In addition, we disaggregate each entry probability and joint probability by the type of union (cohabitation versus marriage). Fo example, we report the probability of cohabiting by age 24, the probability of marrying by age 24, and the probability of forming any union by age 24, which is the sum of the two preceding probabilities.
In table 4, we provide several examples of simulated sequences of marital outcomes to illustrate our calculations. Row 1 shows a simulation in which the woman remains single at age 24; because she is not predicted to cohabit (C) or marry (M) by age 24, simulated outcomes beyond age 24 are irrelevant to the computation of first-union probabilities. Row 2 shows a simulated path that leads to marriage (M) at age 19, while both paths in rows 3-4 lead to cohabitation (C) at age 21. If these four cases were to represent our sample of N·150 simulations, our predicted probabilities of cohabiting by age 24, marrying by age 24, and cohabiting or marrying by age 24 would be 0.50, 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. The simulations in row 2 and 4 reveal unions that last beyond 12 years; in the latter case the cohabiting union converts to marriage at age 23 and endures at least to age 36. Based on these examples, the predicted, joint probability of experiencing a long-term first union formed via cohabitation is 0.25, and the comparable probability for a first union formed via marriage is also 0.25. Rows 5-6 in table 4 show two simulated sequences in which the woman separates from her first partner at age 30, so both sequences would be used to calculate probabilities related to second unions. In this twoobservation sample, the probability of entering a second union via marriage by age 36 is 0.50.
IV. DATA A. Sample Selection
Our primary data source is the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). The survey began in 1979 with a sample of 12,686 individuals born in [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] . The original sample is 60% nonblack, non-Hispanic, 25% black, and 15% Hispanic, and roughly 50% male. Respondents were surveyed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially thereafter; we use data for survey years 1979 through 2008. 12 In selecting a sample for our analysis, we begin by eliminating the 6,403 NLSY79 respondents who are male. We confine our attention to women because they (and their children) tend to be the focus of marriage-related public policy. Next, we eliminate 3,424 female respondents whose 18 th birthdays occur more than nine months before the 1979 interview date, who drop out of the survey before their 18 th birthday, or who marry or cohabit before their 18 th birthday. These selection rules produce a sample of 2,859 women born in 1960-64 who are single (never married, never cohabited) when first observed. We use the age 18 cutoff in order to initialize stage 1, to the extent possible, on the basis of an exogenous factor (age) rather than self-determined events such as observed first unions. Ideally, we would initialize stage 1 when each woman starts making union-forming decisions, but this occurs prior to the start of the survey for many women, given that individuals can cohabit long before they can legally marry. Among the 2,859 women who are observed from their 18 th birthdays onward and who are single at that starting date, we eliminate another 98 individuals because key variables are missing. The remaining sample consists of 2,761 women, 29% of whom are black and 17% of whom are Hispanic.
We construct an annual observation for each of these individuals from the year they are age 18 until the year of their last interview. For each person-year observation, we identify the respondent's marital state as single, cohabiting, or married, and we determine which new state, if any, she transitions to during the succeeding 12 months. If a woman is single at the time of the 1990 and 1991 interviews, for example, we must ensure that no marriage or cohabitation takes place between interviews in order to identify the observation as "single-to-single" (SS). Similarly, if she reports herself as cohabiting in 1990 and 1991, we must make sure she is with the same partner to classify the observation as "cohabiting-to-cohabiting" (CC) rather than "cohabiting-to-single" (CS). To associate each person-year observation with a transition type, we use all available information on marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. NLSY79 respondents report their marital status at each interview, and they also provide a complete event history of the dates when each marriage begins and ends. From 1990 onward, dates for cohabitation spells are reported as well. Although start and end dates for cohabitation spells are not reported prior to 1990, we know whether the respondent is cohabitating at the time of each interview, and we also have identifier codes for each cohabiting partner. If a respondent is cohabiting in two successive interviews but with different partners, we will correctly identify the CS transition. Similarly, when a respondent divorces and remarries between interviews there is no danger of treating her as continuously married; the transition will be correctly identified as "married-to-single" (MS). 13 We use information on marital states and transitions to divide the sample of person-year observations into five stage-specific samples, summarized in table 5. The stage 1 sample contains 20,810 observations for all 2,761 women in our sample; each woman is in stage 1 from age 18 until she forms a first union, or until she is last interviewed. The stage 2 sample consists of 4,721 observations for 1,292 women in cohabiting unions. Due to the relatively small number of cohabiting unions observed in the data, we do not restrict this stage to first cohabiting spells.
The stage 3 sample contains 25,566 observations for 2,178 women in their first marriages. The sample for stages 4 contains 10,850 observations corresponding to second and subsequent "resingle" spells experienced by 1,492 women who were previously cohabiting and/or married, while the stage 5 sample contains 6,092 observations for 724 women in second, third, and fourth marriages. We emphasize that the women appearing in stages 2-5 are a subset of the 2,761 women in stage 1. A woman can remain in stage 1 throughout the observation period if she never forms a union or, at the other extreme, she can appear in all five stages (with multiple spells in stages 2, 4 and 5) if she has multiple partners during the observation period. Each woman contributes between two and 30 observations to the five-stage sample. A woman must turn age 18 prior to her 1979 interview and remain in the survey through 2008 to contribute 30 observations; women who are born later or who drop out of the survey contribute fewer observations.
B. Covariates
The multi-stage, discrete choice model described in section III assumes that on an annual basis, each woman chooses the available marital state that yields the greatest expected utility. In light of this assumed decision-making process, we control for covariates that are likely to affect the cost and benefit associated with being single, cohabiting, and marrying. While many of our covariates are time-invariant from age 18 onward, for time-varying variables we use the value that prevails during the calendar year associated with the given person-year observation for estimation because contemporaneous values (as opposed to lagged or lead values) are likely to best represent the woman's current assessment of the value of each state.
We group our extensive set of covariates into four categories: marital history variables, policy and market factors, demographic and family background factors, and skill factors. We discuss the variables within each category in turn; summary statistics for each covariate for the stage 1-3 samples are reported in table 6.
In each stage-specific model, we control for a number of marital history variables. The probability of a union-related transition has been shown to change dramatically with current spell duration, in part because couples invest in union-specific capital (Bennett et al. 1988; Lichter et al. 2006; Lillard et al. 1995) . We allow for duration dependence with a measure of current spell duration in years and its square; it is clear from the estimates in table 7 that the degree of duration dependence differs dramatically by stage, but extensive experimentation revealed that more flexible functional forms are unnecessary. In select stages, we also control for the age at which the current spell began, the number of prior cohabitation spells, the number of prior marriages, and an indicator of whether the woman cohabited with her husband prior to the current marriage. These are not included in all stages because, for example, all spells in stage 1 are initialized at age 18, while the number of prior marriages is uniformly zero in stage 1 and the stage 3 sample of first marriages.
To control for potential welfare benefits, we include measures of the maximum, monthly AFDC or TANF benefit available for a family of four, divided by the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product (GDP), and the average Medicaid expenditure for a family of four, divided by the consumer price index (CPI) for medical care. We use 1996 as the base year for both price indices. Both measures are specific to the state of residence and calendar year corresponding to the person-year observation, and are independent of the woman's income, household composition, and eligibility.
14 To measure the expected income tax penalty or bonus associated with marriage, we begin by associating every person-year observation in a given stage with a uniform measure of expected earnings for women in that stage, and a uniform measure of expected earnings for a hypothetical, male partner of women in that stage. These two earnings measures are the median, predicted earnings obtained by estimating stage-specific, gender-specific earnings models with data reported by all NLSY79 respondents who are at least 18 years old and whose current marital status corresponds to the given stage (single with no prior unions, cohabiting, first marriage, etc.).
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After merging these median earnings variables into our (women only) samples, we then use the calendar year and state of residence corresponding to each person-year observation to compute the woman's expected state income tax burden, assuming she and her (real or hypothetical) partner have no dependents and no other taxable income. We first assume each median couple is married and filing jointly, and we then assume they are single or cohabiting and filing separately.
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The expected income tax liability if married net of the expected liability if nonmarried is our measure of the state income tax marriage penalty or bonus.
Within each stage, variation in our income tax variable depends entirely on state of residence and calendar year; because we assign every woman the identical median income for herself and her hypothetical partner, our tax variable is independent of the woman's (and her partner's) actual income, as well as family size, schooling, and any other factors that affect income tax liabilities. Our measure varies considerably both within and across years because we rely on state income tax policies rather than federal laws. We use state rather than federal income tax codes because the latter contains no within-year variation, which means we would be unable to separate variation in expected (federal) income tax obligations from aging and union duration effects, given the narrow range of birth years in our sample. Table 6 reveals that the stage 1 mean of our state tax variable (deflated by the implicit price deflator for GDP, using 1996 as the base year) is $46, with a standard error of $117. We are not arguing that cohabitation, marriage, and divorce decisions are driven by costs of this magnitude. Instead, we rely on the fact that variation in this exogenous measure is representative of variation in women's actual (federal and state) income tax obligations.
Our policy variables also include two measures of state laws governing divorce. As discussed in section II, virtually all states allow some form of no fault divorce during our observation period, so we instead control for whether they grant unilateral divorce (no fault divorce without mutual consent) with and without separation requirements. Table 6 shows that 50% of the stage 1 observations are contributed by women living in states with unilateral divorce (without separation requirements), while another 28% of observations correspond to states that grant no fault or unilateral divorce after a period of mandatory separation; table 3 shows which states fall into each category.
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In light of evidence presented in Friedberg (1998) and Iyvarakul et al. (2011) , we experimented with a more extensive set of variables to distinguish between no fault and unilateral divorce, to identify the length of mandatory separations, and to identify whether fault can be established as grounds for divorce. None of our experiments had a substantive effect on the findings reported in section V, although some yielded estimated coefficients that are smaller in magnitude than what we obtain with a simple, two-variable classification of divorce law.
Our five policy-related covariates-each of which is intended to capture a potential economic incentive to marry, cohabit, or divorce-capture cross-state and, to a lesser extent, cross-year differences in state policies and laws governing transfers, income taxes, and laws. We rely heavily on cross-state variation in these policy variables because we follow women born within a five-year window from age 18 forward and, therefore, would be hard-pressed to separate aging and union duration effects from any cross-year changes in policy. 18 Given our reliance on crossstate variation, our claims that each variable is strictly exogenous relies on the assumption that women do not choose their state of residence in conjunction with their marital status to lower divorce costs, reduce income taxes, or increase welfare or Medicaid benefits.
In addition to our policy variables, we include three contextual variables that represent characteristics of sample members' marriage markets: the percent of the respondent's county 17 We base our classification on data reported in Friedberg (1998) . We also examined state-level data available at abanet.org as well as numerous state-specific websites to determine whether any states changed regimes during the latter part of our observation period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . 18 Because of this cohort effect, we cannot control for any policies that arose relatively late in the 30-year observation period, such as covenant marriage laws (enacted in several states around 2000), state-level earned income tax credits (which were rare prior to the late 1990s), and TANF-specific rules (introduced in 1996 and later). For the stage 1 model in particular, these variables play the role of "late first union" indicators, and cause significant changes in the estimated duration coefficients. population that is male, the percent of the county population that is the same race/ethnicity (black, Hispanic, or other) as the respondent, and the county unemployment rate. All three variables are constructed by merging county-level data from the City and County Data Book (collected by the U.S. Census Bureau) with the NLSY79 data, using county of residence indicators from the NLSY79 Geocode file.
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Variables such as these have also been used by Lichter et al. (1991 Lichter et al. ( , 2002 and others.
To control for demographic factors and family influences that might affect union formation, we use an extensive array of time-constant variables, all of which are reported in 1979. This includes dummy variables indicating whether the woman is black or Hispanic, whether she was born outside the U.S., and whether she lived with a single mother, a mother and stepfather, or both biological parents at age 14; any living arrangement that did not include the mother forms the omitted group. We also control for each sample member's mother's highest grade completed, and for an indicator that "reading materials" (magazines, newspapers, and/or a library card) were available in the woman's household at age 14. To account for the presence of children while satisfying our desire to rely on covariates that are exogenous to the union-forming process, we control for whether any children were born to the respondent prior to the start of stage 1 (i.e., before age 18). Our background measures also include dummy variables indicating the woman's reported religion (with no religion as the omitted category) and frequency of church attendance, and a measure of how "traditional" her views are. We construct a traditional values measure by summing the number of times she agrees or strongly agrees with seven statements about family, including "a woman's place is in the home, not in the office or shop," and "women are much happier if they stay at home and take care of their children." Traditional values scores range from zero to seven.
Our remaining covariates measure labor market skills and, as such, serve as exogenous measures of earnings potential. These measures include each woman's "final" highest grade completed (as of age 35) and scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). AFQT scores are derived from scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, which was administered to NLSY79 respondents in 1980. We regress percentile AFQT scores on a set of birth-year dummies and use the residual as the age-adjusted score; unadjusted percentile scores are reported in table 6. Our measure of highest grade completed is arguably endogenous to the union-forming process, yet we include it because our key findings prove to be robust to whether we use actual highest grade completed, predicted highest grade completed, or high school graduation status at age 18. In stages where a partner is present (stages 3, 4, and 5) we also control for the spouse's or cohabiting partner's highest grade completed as a measure of his earnings potential. Table 7 contains estimated parameters for all five stages of our choice model. Before turning our attention to the predicted probabilities obtained by using the parameter estimates in table 7 to simulate long-term outcomes, we assess the signs of select covariates. Table 7 reveals that increased AFDC or TANF benefits are associated with fewer transitions into marriage (S to M) and more transitions into cohabitation (S to C) among single women in stages 1 and 4, as well as fewer transitions to marriage (C to M) among cohabiters in stage 2 (although not all coefficients are statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels). These patterns indicate that exogenous decreases in AFDC/TANF benefits might induce single women to marry, but union formation will not necessarily increase if these S to M transitions are offset by fewer S to C transitions. Moreover, we find that increased benefits are associated with a decreased probability of divorce among women in first and subsequent marriages (stages 3 and 5)-which is consistent with evidence in Bitler et al. (2004) that transitions from AFDC to TANF led to less divorce-so exogenous decreases in benefits will not necessarily promote long-term unions even if they induce more women to marry.
V. FINDINGS A. Estimated Coefficients for Year-to-Year Transitions
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This simple assessment of the signs of the estimated AFDC/TANF coefficients in table 7 highlights the fact that multi-stage computations of the probabilities of experiencing long-term unions can conflict with single-stage computations of the probabilities of entering unions.
Unilateral divorce laws prove to be associated with increased divorce probabilities among firstmarried women (stage 3) and remarried women (stage 5), although estimates in the latter model lack precision. Surprisingly, unilateral divorce is associated with increased entry into marriage among single women with no prior unions (stage 1) and cohabiting women (stage 2), but with decreased entry into marriage among "re-single" women in stage 4 (although most divorcerelated parameter estimates lack precision). These patterns highlight the fact that we cannot fully assess effects of divorce laws on the decision to divorce without simultaneously considering the preceding decision to marry (Mechoulan 2006) . Table 7 also reveals that the estimated coefficients for family background, demographic, and skill-related measures are consistent with patterns that are well-established in the literature. Blacks and women who were raised by a single mother appear to have lower probabilities than others of entering marriage and cohabitation via any route (S to C, S to M, and C to M). Women who attend church on a weekly basis or who have traditional values are predicted to be less likely than others to cohabit or divorce, especially in early stages. Higher schooling levels are associated with an increased probability of marrying in stages 2 and 4 but a decreased probability of marrying in stage 1, given that college-educated women tend to marry relatively late; higher schooling attainment is also associated with a decreased probability of divorce (stages 3 and 5).
B. Predicted Probabilities of Long-Term Unions
Our primary goal is to learn whether each factor of interest-especially those factors that can potentially be manipulated by public policy-has an economically significant effect on the probability of forming a union within a given age interval, and maintaining that union for at least 12 years. Because these inferences cannot be made by examining each short-term transition probability, we turn to the results of our long-term simulations.
To compute the estimates in tables 8-9 we use our stage 1 sample of 2,761 single women with no prior unions, and simulate their outcomes from ages 18 to 48 as described in section III.B. Table 8 shows the predicted probability that 18 year old women form a first union in the next six years (i.e., by age 24) as well as the joint probability of forming that first union and maintaining it for the next 12 years. Thus, these predictions are based on simulated outcomes from age 18 to a maximum age of 36. Table 9 shows the predicted probability that 30 year old women enter a second union within six years (i.e., by age 36) conditional on having terminated a prior union at age 30. It also provides the joint probability of entering a second union as just described and maintaining it for at least 12 years. The predicted probabilities summarized in table 9 are from the same simulations used for table 8, but use outcomes for the entire age range (18-48). As described in section III.B., we perform a baseline simulation (reported in row 1 of tables 8-9) in which all women are assigned their actual, initial values for each covariate; all time-varying covariates aside from marital history variables (current spell duration, number of prior spells, etc.) are held constant throughout the simulation. The estimated "marginal effects" summarized in rows 2-13 of tables 8-9 are based on subsequent simulations in which each woman is assigned an identical value for the given covariate or set of covariates indicated in tables 8-9.
Focusing first on table 8, the top row reveals that 23% of 18 year old, single women are expected to enter into cohabitation by age 24, while 37% are expected to move directly into marriage.
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Adding these numbers together reveals that women in our sample have a 60% chance of forming a first union by age 24. While cohabitation is not the modal form of entering a first union by age 24, it is common enough to raise the probability of union formation by 23 percentage points, or by 62% relative to the "marriage only" probability of 0.37. The right-most columns of table 8 show that women in our sample are predicted to have a 8.1% chance of cohabiting by age 24 and remaining with their partner for at least 12 years (including cases where the cohabiting couple marries within the 12-year interval), a 20.2% chance of marrying by age 24 and remaining married for at least 12 years and, therefore, a 28.3% chance of forming and maintaining a union 21 To clarify, 22.8% of simulated paths from age 18 to 24 have the form SC*, SSC*, SSSC*, SSSSC*, SSSSSC*, or SSSSSSC*, where an asterisk represents the fact that simulated outcomes beyond the initial single-to-cohabiting transition are irrelevant for this computation. Similarly, 36.7% have simulated paths of the type SM*, SSM*, SSSM*, etc. of either type. We can infer from these estimates that unions entered via cohabitation have a 36% chance of surviving for 12 years (0.081/0.228), while unions entered via marriage have a 55% chance of surviving. Cohabitation is not as likely as marriage to lead to a long-term union, but because it is such a common form of entry it ultimately raises the probability of experiencing a "long-term" first union by eight percentage points, or by 40% relative to the "marriage only" probability. In short, cohabitation proves to make a larger contribution to long-term union formation than analysts might infer by focusing on cohabiters' relatively high annual rates of dissolution.
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Before proceeding to the estimated effects of alternative policy and nonpolicy factors, we emphasize that the predicted probabilities of experiencing a long-term union entered by cohabitation or marriage (reported in the right-most columns of tables 8-9) constitute our "bottom line" estimates. Although an assessment of the benefits to marriage and cohabitation is beyond the scope of our analysis, there is little reason to believe that cohabitation is less preferred than marriage when the focus is on long-term unions. Most evidence on the relative merits of marriage is based on the fact that cohabiting unions tend to be quite short (Bumpass et al. 1991; Lichter et al. 2006) ; when long-term unions are analyzed, however, marriage is not necessarily more beneficial than cohabitation (Willets 2006 ).
In rows 2-13 of table 8, we show how each predicted long-term probability in row 1 changes when we re-run the simulations after assigning each sample member the identical value for one or more select covariates. To assess the role of welfare availability, we set the maximum, monthly AFDC/TANF benefit to an amount ($261 in 1995 dollars) that would place each state's generosity in the tenth percentile of the stage 1 distribution. This intervention causes the predicted probability of marrying by age 24 to increase by 0.066, and it causes the predicted probability of marrying by age 24 and remaining married for at least 12 years to increase by 0.019. These estimated effects represent increases in the baseline (row 1) marriage probabilities of 18% and 9%, respectively. However, the same hypothetical policy intervention is predicted to decrease the probability of entering a first union via cohabitation by 0.038 and decrease the probability of entering and maintaining a cohabiting union by 0.016; both increments represent a 17-20% reduction in the baseline estimates seen in row 1. In total, this dramatic policy intervention-which, needless to say, could directly harm the well-being of eligible women and their children independent of any effects it might have on union formation-is predicted to increase the probability that women experience long-term, first unions by a mere one-third of a percentage point.
As small as the estimated effect of AFDC/TANF benefits on long-term first unions proves to be, the policy interventions considered in rows 3-4 of table 8 have even smaller estimated effects.
When Medicaid expenditures are set at the tenth percentile value, the predicted probability of forming a union increases by 1.3 percentage points, and the predicted probability of forming and maintaining a union increases by only 0.002. Setting the income tax penalty at the tenth percentile value (which amounts to a marriage bonus of $47) causes a slight substitution in entry probabilities away from cohabitation towards marriage, but ultimately has a trivial effect on the predicted joint probability of entering and maintaining a first union. Row 5 of table 8 reveals that the elimination of unilateral divorce has a somewhat larger effect than the welfare and tax interventions: The elimination of unilateral divorce is predicted to lower the probability of entering a union of any type by 0.014 and to raise the probability of entering and maintaining a union of any type by 0.02. This is the biggest "bottom line" effect seen in rows 2-5 of table 8, yet an increment of 0.02 represents only a 7% increase relative to the baseline probability of 0.283 shown in row 1.
In summary, all of our assumed policy interventions prove to be "marriage enhancing," but none has an economically important effect on the predicted probability that young women experience long-term first unions. Many of these factors have a sizeable, statistically significant effect on the predicted probability of making select year-to-year transitions, but "adding up" those predicted, year-to-year transition probabilities over successive periods (and especially across stages of the model) reveals that each policy intervention has a trivial effect on long-term outcomes. We emphasize that our predicted long-term probabilities are a function of underlying short-term probabilities and, therefore, represent the same underlying decision-making.
Turning to rows 6-13 of table 8, several factors that cannot be readily manipulated by policy prove to have substantial effects on the predicted probability of a long-term union. For example, women who are "white" (nonblack and non-Hispanic) are predicted to be 6.7 percentage points (29%) more likely than the women in the baseline (row 1) simulations to cohabit, 4.7 percentage points (13%) more likely to marry, and 4.4 percentage points (16%) more likely to form a union of either type and maintain it for at least 12 years. This finding is consistent with widespread evidence (seen in table 7) that white women are far less likely than blacks to cohabit and marry. Table 8 also reveals relatively large estimated marginal effects for AFQT scores (row 11) and traditional values (row 13). Setting each woman's AFQT score to the 90 th percentile in the overall distribution leads to a 1.6 percentage point decrease in the predicted probability of marrying by age 24, but a nearly-offsetting increase in the predicted probability of cohabiting. This intervention leads to a 4.4 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of forming any union and maintaining it for at least 12 years because unions entered via cohabitation and marriage tend to last longer when women have high AFQT scores. A very different pattern is seen among women with traditional values: Women who score at the 90 th percentile on this scale (which corresponds to agreeing or strongly agreeing with four out of seven statements about traditional family values) are 6.8 percentage points more likely than the typical woman to marry by age 24, and 5.2 percentage points more likely to marry and stay married for at least 12 years. However, a high traditional values score has an opposite-signed effect on the predicted probability of cohabiting, so the bottom line is that these women are only 1.2 percentage points more likely form a first union, and only 3.3 percentage points more likely to form and maintain a first union.
Among the remaining "interventions" considered in table 8, we find that a favorable marriage market (row 6) and living with both parents at age 14 (row 8) are predicted to drive women away from cohabitation toward marriage, but to an economically insignificant degree. Similarly, not bearing a child prior to age 18 (row 10) proves to have a trivial effect on the predicted probability of entering or maintaining a first union. Setting either the mother's highest grade completed or the woman's own highest grade completed equal to 16+ years (rows 9 and 12) lowers the predicted probability of experiencing a long-term first union, but this effect operates solely through a decreased probability of union entry-e.g., in row 12 we see that collegeeducated women are 6.7 (5.6) percentage points less likely than the typical woman to cohabit (marry) by age 24. Although both schooling variables-which are exogenous predictors of women's earnings potential-are considered favorable to union formation in general, these findings are consistent with the notion that they promote unions at later ages. Table 9 presents the same predicted probabilities as table 8, but now the focus is on second unions formed by women who dissolve a previous cohabitation or marriage at age 30. The estimates in row 1 of table 9 differ from what is seen in table 8 in a number of ways. First, the predicted probability of forming any union within six years is lower for women when they are 30 and divorced/separated than it was when they were 18 with no prior unions: we estimate that the former have only a 55% chance of entering a second union by age 36 (table 9), whereas the latter have a 60% chance of entering a first union (table 8) . Second, the predicted probability of cohabiting in the next six years is much higher at age 30 than at age 18 and, in fact, cohabitation is the modal form of entry into second unions: in row 1 of table 9, we see that the predicted probability of cohabiting by age 36 is 0.391 (versus 0.228 in table 8), which is 2.4 times greater than the predicted probability of marrying by age 36. Third, second unions are predicted to be more likely than first unions to last for at least 12 years. Dividing each joint probability by its corresponding entry probability, we see that second unions that begin via cohabitation have a 57% chance of being long-lasting (versus 36% in table 8), while unions that begin with marriage have a 66% chance of lasting for 12+ years (versus 55% in table 8). Fourth, the patterns seen in entry probabilities carry over to joint probabilities: 30 year old "divorcées" are more likely to enter and maintain a cohabiting union than they were as 18 year olds (0.221 versus 0.081), less likely to enter and maintain a marriage (0.107 versus 0.202) and, adding up the predicted probabilities, more likely to enter and maintain a union of either type (0.328 versus 0.283).
Turning to the estimated incremental effects shown in rows 2-13 of table 9, one overarching pattern is immediately apparent: with few exceptions, the "marginal effects" in table 9 are estimated much less precisely than their counterparts in table 8, and most are statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels. Even though some of the point estimates in table 9 are larger than what is seen in table 8, our primary conclusion is that we identify no policy factor that could reliably be used to incentivize long-term second unions among women in their 30s. Row 5 of table 9 reveals that elimination of unilateral divorce is predicted to raise the probability of forming and maintaining a second union by 0.035, which represents a 11% boost relative to the baseline estimate in row 1. However, the large standard error precludes us from pointing to this factor (or any other factor considered in rows 2-5) as a potentially useful policy tool for promoting long-term second union formation.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Current and recent U.S. public policy can be characterized as pro-marriage. Examples include the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, all of which changed federal tax law to provide "marriage penalty" relief; the 1996 Healthy Marriage Initiative, in which numerous federal programs provide services to help couples sustain their marriages; and Covenant Marriage laws passed in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana that allow married couples to limit the grounds by which they can be divorced. Many social scientists have taken a pro-marriage stance in their research by arguing that marriage enhances a range of important outcomes. Prominent examples include and Waite and Gallagher (2000) .
In our view, discussion about union formation will benefit from additional information on two issues. First, social scientists should continue to learn whether marriage (or cohabitation) causes various outcomes rather than simply being correlated with them. Progress has been made in assessing the causal effects of marriage and cohabitation on wages (Cornwell and Rupert 1997; Gray 1997; Korenman and Neumark 1991; Loh 1996; Stratton 2002) , family income (Light 2004) , and selected child outcomes (Levine and Painter 2000) , but much "pro-marriage" evidence continues to be based on cross-sectional correlations. Second, if the promotion of marriage is judged to be desirable, we should learn more about how marriage decisions can be influenced-that is, we should identify factors that can be manipulated by public policy and that causally increase the probability that individuals will get married and stay married. Without taking a stand on whether such policy is desirable, we contribute evidence on this second issue.
We consider a range of policy factors that can potentially be used to incentivize long-term unions: AFDC/TANF benefits, Medicaid expenditures, income tax laws, and divorce laws. While the effects of these factors on union formation have been studied before, we are able to compare their estimated effects side by side, and use simulations to determine whether policy interventions can be expected to promote long-term unions. We identify one policy intervention (lowering maximum AFDC/TANF benefits in all states to the tenth percentile value) with a nontrivial effect on the predicted probability that young women enter a first marriage by age 24, but this intervention has a near-zero effect on the predicted probability of forming a first union and maintaining it for at least 12 years. Another intervention (the elimination of unilateral divorce) raises the predicted probability of entering and maintaining a long-term first union by two percentage points (7% relative to the baseline probability) despite lowering the predicted probability of union entry. All policy interventions that we consider have imprecisely estimated effects on the likelihood that women form second unions by age 36 and maintain them for at least 12 years. At the same time, we find that factors that are not easily controlled by public policy, such as race, schooling, and the presence of children are often predicted to be important determinants of long-term unions. In short, we fail to identify policy mechanisms that could potentially be used to incentivize long-term unions. $14,618 and $25,581 in 1985, and $24,369 and $42,646 in 2005 . Each individual couple is assumed to have no taxable income other than earned income, no itemized deductions, and no dependents. Row c shows the total tax bill for a cohabiting couple with the assumed income levels, while row d shows the couple's tax bill if married and filing jointly. The difference between rows d and c is the tax penalty (if positive) or bonus (if negative) associated with marriage. Tax obligations are calculated using version 9 of Internet TAXSIM available at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/. Friedberg (1998) and additional sources detailed in section IV.B. 
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Note: These mock simulated outcomes (shown only to age 36) illustrate cases where the woman is predicted to enter a first cohabiting union by age 24 (C by age 24), enter a first marriage by age 24 (M by age 24), maintain a first union for at least 12 years (maintain 12+ yrs), enter a second union via cohabitation by age 36 (C by age 36), or enter a second union via marriage by age 36 (M by age 36). The column titled "Re-S at age 30" identifies simulated outcomes where the individual becomes "re-single" by separating from a first partner at age 30. Row 1 is based on simulated outcomes for a sample of 2,761 women with no prior unions. Each woman's history from age 18 to 48 is simulated 150 times, using actual covariate values and a random draw from the estimated parameter distributions in table 7. The left three columns are predicted probabilities of entering a first union by age 24 via cohabitation (C), marriage (M), or either; the right three columns are predicted joint probabilities of entering and maintaining those unions for at least 12 years; standard errors are in parentheses. † Rows 2-13 show the increment to the predicted probability shown in row 1 obtained by assigning each woman the specified covariate value(s) and using actual values for all nonspecified covariates; standard errors of the differences are in parentheses. Rows 2-13 show the increment to the predicted probability shown in row 1 obtained by assigning each woman the specified covariate value(s) and using actual values for all nonspecified covariates; standard errors of the differences are in parentheses.
